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Appellant, the City of Blackfoot (the "City" or "Blackfoot"), through its attorneys of
record, Garrett H. Sandow, Blackfoot's City Attorney, and Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo,
P.L.L.C., hereby submits Appellant's Brief

I.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Nature of the Case.
The City is seeking a water right to allow it to replace an expensive surface water pump

system with an easier-to-maintain well system, and offers the annual seepage from the Jensen's
Grove gravel pit into the Eastern Snake Plain Aquifer (the "ESP A") as mitigation. A prior
proceeding concerning the Jensen's Grove water right was settled by agreement, which allows
the City itself to utilize the seepage as mitigation. Without considering the settlement agreement,
the Idaho Department of Water Resources ("IDWR" or the "Department") denied the application
and the District Court affirmed.

B.

Course of Proceedings.
The City submitted the Application for Permit No. 27-12261 ("12261") on September 12,

2013. Agency Record ("A.R."), pp. 1-27. The original application was signed by then-Mayor
Mike Virtue.

A.R., p. 3.

On September 2, 2014, the Department assisted the City with

preparation of an amended application for permit, which was signed by Mayor Paul Loomis. 1
A.R., pp. 28-58. On January 27, 2015, the City submitted a second amended application with the
further assistance of Rocky Mountain Environmental Associates, Inc., complete with an
Evidence of the Department's assistance is contained in the style and layout of a map submitted with the
amended application.
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amended mitigation plan. A.R., pp. 92-105.

second amended application was also signed

by Mayor Paul Loomis. A.R., p. 93.
After these amendments, 12261 sought a water right permit to develop 9.71 cfs of ground
water for the irrigation of 524.2 acres with a portion of Water Right No. Ol-181C ("181C"), a
Snake River surface water right, being offered as mitigation for the depletive effects to the ESP A
resulting from diversion of groundwater under 12261. A.R., pp. 200-01.
12261 was protested by the Surface Water Coalition (the "Coalition"). 2 At the contested
case hearing, the Coalition stipulated that items (b) through (e) of Idaho Code§ 42-203A(5) were
not at issue, and specifically stipulated that they did not disagree with or object to the modeling
analysis performed quantifying the recharge benefits of water lost from a gravel pit known as
Jensen's Grove from the diversion of 181C into Jensen's Grove or the proposal to leave small
portions of certain surface water rights in the Blackfoot River to mitigate for modeling impacts
to downstream reaches of the Snake River.

A.R., pp. 203-04, 207.

More specifically, the

Coalition's concern was not factual in nature, but only based on legal issues surrounding
interpretation of a document entitled Settlement Agreement, IDWR Transfer of Water Right,

Transfer No. 72385, dated June 2006 (the "Settlement Agreement"), which was entered into
when 181 C was amended and moved for use at Jensen's Grove through a transfer application
submitted pursuant to Idaho Code§ 42-222. A.R., Hrg. Exh. List, Exhibit 4, pp. 18-23.

The Surface Water Coalition is comprised of: A&B Irrigation District, Burley Irrigation District, Milner
Irrigation District, North Side Canal Company, and Twin Falls Canal Company (represented by Barker Rosholt
& Simpson LLP); together with American Falls Reservoir District #2 and Minidoka Irrigation District
(represented by Fletcher Law Office).
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fact, the Coalition presented no witnesses at the hearing. Transcript of Administrative
Proceedings ("Admin. Tr."), p. 49, 11. 21-23. Stated another way, the Coalition did not submit
evidence of any factual concerns or rebuttal testimony or analysis regarding the modeling
analysis and other analyses submitted by the City, or to rebut the reality that ground water
recharge occurs at Jensen's Grove under 181C. The only assertion of injury was that use of
181 C for mitigation would injure the Coalition because it would be used differently than the
Coalition believed the Settlement Agreement allowed it to. A.R., pp. 155-56. The Coalition
asserts that 181 C was not authorized to be used for mitigation purposes. A.R., pp. 163-69. This
is why briefing was submitted specifically addressing the legal question of: "Is there a legal
impediment to using water right O1-181 C in a mitigation plan for the proposed permit?" A.R., p.
200. Therefore, the only item under Idaho Code§ 42-203A(5) at issue was subpart (a), which is
whether 12261 "will reduce the quantity of water under existing water rights" based on the
Coalition's interpretation of the Settlement Agreement and its perceived limitations of using
181 C for mitigation purposes.
On June 30, 2015, the hearing officer issued a Preliminary Order Issuing Permit (the

"Preliminary Order"), which issued 12261 with the condition that the City file a transfer
application under Idaho Code § 42-222 to allow it to use the recharge provided by I 81 C as
mitigation for 12261. A.R., pp. 200-16. On July 14, 2015, the City filed exceptions to the

Preliminary Order pursuant to Idaho Code § 67-5245(3) and IDAPA 37.01.01.430.02.b. and
asked the Director of the Idaho Department of Water Resources, Gary Spackman (the
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"Director") to correct perceived errors made by the hearing officer in reaching his conclusion.
A.R., pp. 220-44. The Coalition responded on July 30, 2015. A.R., pp. 249-69.
On September 22, 2015, the Director issued an Order Addressing Exceptions and

Denying Application for Permit (the "Final Order") within which the Director refused to
consider the Settlement Agreement, found that 181 C could not be used for ground water recharge
without an approved transfer application, and denied the City's application for 12261. A.R., pp.
271-74.
The City filed a petition for judicial review with the District Court, pursuant to Idaho
Code§§ 42-1701A(4), 67-5270, and 67-5279, on October 16, 2015. A.R., pp. 278-85. On April
6, 2016, the District Court affirmed the Final Order, in its Memorandum Decision and Order
(the "Memorandum Decision"), which led to the Judgment, also filed April 6, 2016.
C.

Statement of Facts.
With a population of nearly 12,000, the City of Blackfoot is one of eastern Idaho's major

cities.

See, e.g., http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/16/1607840.html; Error! Hyperlink

reference not valid.. Many years ago, during the planning and construction of Interstate 15
("I-15"), the Blackfoot City fathers were approached by Federal Highway Administration
officials to discuss relocation of a portion of the Snake River channel because doing so would
eliminate construction of four bridges, thereby saving the federal government the expense of
constructing the bridges. Admin. Tr., p. 35, 1. 22-p. 36, 1. 10. As responsible citizens, these City
fathers recognized the benefit to taxpayers, and agreed to the channel relocation even though
doing so would mean sacrificing significant riverfront property. Admin. Tr., p. 36, 11. 19-23.
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therefore effectively replaced Snake River riverfront property with a gravel pit, which
has since been used to mine gravel for road construction. Admin. Tr., p. 29, l. 16-p. 30, I. 17.
This gravel pit that exists at the former location of a portion of the Snake River channel on the
east side of I-15 is known as Jensen's Grove. A.R., pp. 203-04.
Decades after the City allowed the federal government to relocate the Snake River
channel, the City was awarded a federal grant of approximately $250,000, through the help of
Congressman Mike Simpson, to secure a water right to fill and maintain water levels in Jensen's
Grove during the summer months. Admin. Tr., p. 36, 1. 24-p. 37, 1. 11. The City used these
funds to purchase 181C from the New Sweden Irrigation District. Admin. Tr., p. 37, 11. 12-15;
see also A.R., Hrg. Exh. List, Exhibit 2, p. 12. These federal funds represent payment for only a

small part of the losses the City incurred by giving up its riverfront property, and the benefit of
the City's purchase of a water right for Jensen's Grove is that it salvaged some of that loss by
creating a recreational area and facility for local residents. In order to use 181 C, which was
originally solely an irrigation right, Admin. Tr., p. 37, 11. 16-19, for all the purposes intended by
the City-including recreation-the City filed a transfer application on October 27, 2005 to
amend 181C which was numbered as Transfer No. 72385 ("72385"). A.R., Hrg. Exh. List,
Exhibit 6, pp. 28-43. The transfer requested (1) a change in the place of use to relocate it to
Jensen's Grove and (2) changes to the nature of use of 181 C to diversion to storage, storage,
diversion to recharge, as well as retaining a small portion for irrigation purposes. A.R., Hrg.
Exh. List, Exhibit 6, p. 28.
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The Coalition protested 72385. See A.R., Hrg. Exh. List, Exhibit 3, p. 15. Eventually,
the parties agreed to resolve the Coalition's protest pursuant to the terms and conditions of the
Settlement Agreement. A.R., Hrg. Exh. List, Exhibit 4, pp. 18-23; id, Exhibit 104, pp. 74-87;
see also id, Exhibit 8, pp. 46-47. The draft approval of 72385 included ground water recharge

and ground water recharge storage as expressly listed beneficial uses of 181 C. A.R., Hrg. Exh.
List, Exhibit 103, p. 72. However, the Coalition took issue, as expressed in a letter from one of
the Coalition's attorneys, which asserted that "[c]ontrary to the [Settlement] Agreement, the draft
approval includes 'ground water recharge' and 'ground water recharge storage' as new purposes
of use for [181C]. These proposed uses should be removed." A.R., Hrg. Exh. List, Exhibit 8, p.
46 (italics added). There is nothing in the record indicating the City's objection to this assertion,
but for the reasons explained below, the City felt that any such objection was unnecessary.
72385 was approved on February 14, 2007. A.R., Hrg. Exh. List, Exhibit 105, pp. 88-90. I81C
now allows the City to divert ( 1) 46 cfs as diversion to storage; (2) 1 cfs and 200 AF for
irrigation; (3) 200 AF for irrigation storage; (4) 200 AF for irrigation from storage; and (5)
2,266.8 AF for recreation storage, of which 1,100 AF of this amount is stored in Jensen's Grove
during its season of use and 980.8 AF is allocated for seepage losses during its season of use.
A.R., Hrg. Exh. List, Exhibit 105, p. 90. As stated by condition no. 5 of the transfer approval for
181C:
The reservoir established by the storage of water under this right shall not
exceed a total capacity of 1100 acre feet or a total surface area of 73
acres. This right authorizes additional storage in the amount of 186
afa to make up losses from evaporation and 980.8 afa for seepage
losses.
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A.R., Hrg. Exh. List, Exhibit 105,

90 ("Condition No. 5") (emphasis added). Thus, in addition

to 980.8 AF of seepage, 1,100 AF of water left in Jensen's Grove at the end of the irrigation
season enters into the aquifer as ground water recharge for an overall total annual loss of 2,080.8
AF. See A.R., Hrg. Exh. List, Exhibit 105, p. 90. The Coalition has not challenged these facts or
the effects described in the City's modeling.

It is this annual seepage loss-ground water

recharge--of 2,080.8 AF that the City seeks to use as mitigation for 12261. See A.R., Hrg. Exh.
List, Exhibit 1, p. 2.
Additionally, condition no. 9 of the transfer approval for 181 C incorporates the
provisions of the Settlement Agreement:
The diversion and use of water under this transfer is subject to
additional conditions and limitations contained in a Settlement
Agreement-IDWR Transfer of Water Right, Transfer No. 72385,
dated June 2006, including any properly executed amendments thereto,
entered into by and between the New Sweden Irrigation District, the City
of Blackfoot, A& B Irrigation District, American Falls Reservoir District
#2, Burley Irrigation District, Milner Irrigation District, Minidoka
Irrigation District, Twin Falls Canal Company, and North Side Canal
Company. The Settlement Agreement has been recorded in Bingham
County (Instrument No. 575897) and Bonneville County (Instrument No.
1249899) and is enforceable by the parties thereto.
A.R., Hrg. Exh. List, Exhibit 105, p. 90 ("Condition No. 9") (emphasis added). Condition No. 5
and Condition No. 9 were incorporated into the SRBA partial decree for 181C as part of the
quantity element and as an "other provision necessary for definition or administration of this
water right," respectively. A.R., Hrg. Exh. List, Exhibit 106, pp. 91-94 (the "Partial Decree").
Thus, both the Department's approval of 72385 and the SRBA partial decree for 181C
incorporate the Settlement Agreement. See A.R., Hrg. Exh. List, Exhibit 105, p. 90; compare id,
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Exhibit 106, p. 93. For that reason, the interpretation of the elements and conditions of 181 C,
including the provisions of the Settlement Agreement-particularly paragraph I-was at issue in
the contested case of 12661. See A.R., pp. 137, 155-156.
The City applied for 12661 in order to replace an expensive and dated surface water
pump station on the Blackfoot River that the City currently operates. The City delivers several
surface water rights through the pump station. Admin. Tr., p. 9, 1. 22-p. 10, 1. 1. The water right
entitlements diverted at the pump station include water rights 3 that were previously delivered
through a facility known as the "Miner's Ditch," as well as water allocated to shares owned by
certain shareholders of the Corbett Slough Irrigation Company and shareholders of the Blackfoot
Irrigation Company. A.R., Hrg. Exh. List, Exhibit 1, p. I; A.R., p. 201.
Prior to the 1960s, Miner's Ditch ran through the City and crossed I-15. Admin. Tr., p. 9,

11. 13-17. Miner's Ditch ran near a proposed school, and in an effort to increase safety and
eliminate the dangers of an open ditch, the City, the State of Idaho, and the local school district
decided to eliminate Miner's Ditch and replace it with a pump station on the Blackfoot River to
provide water to the water users who took delivery of their water through Miner's Ditch. Admin.
Tr., p. 9, 1. 18-p. 10, 1. 1. The pump station arrangement was accepted by the City, not by
agreement, but by actions of the Blackfoot City Council. Admin. Tr., p. 10, 11. 2-9. Since its
construction, the City has maintained the pump station almost entirely on its own. Admin. Tr., p.
10, 11. 10-14. The City only receives a small yearly stipend from the irrigators who benefit from

Water Right Nos. 27-17, 27-20A, 27-208, 27-23E, 27-10790, 27-10999, and 27-11117.
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the pump station, but receives no contribution from the local school district, the State of Idaho,
or others for maintenance and operation of the pump station. Admin. Tr., p. 10, 11. 10-14.
The pump station has proven to be a major burden for the City, both operationally and
financially, particularly with no help from the local school district or the State of Idaho. The
pump station requires significant maintenance because of the high sediment load in Blackfoot
River water. Admin. Tr., p. 10, 11. 21-22. The pump station has to be refurbished every two to
three years, and due to these maintenance issues, operates at an annual cost of between $40,000
and $50,000 per year. Admin. Tr., p. 10, 1. 22-p. 11, 1. 9. The pump station has two pumps, one
of which operates, while the other is being serviced or repaired. Admin. Tr., p. 35, 11. 1-10.
Currently, the concrete culvert and other attendant equipment associated with the pump station
have aged and may need to be replaced soon. Admin. Tr., p. 11, 11. 1-5. As a result, the City,
with the aid of consultants, examined a number of options to address the situation. Admin. Tr.,
p. 11, 1. 10-p. 13, 1. 13. The City analyzed refurbishment of the pump station, installation of
settling ponds, and replacing the delivery of water to the Miner's Ditch users with a well.
Admin. Tr., p. 11, 1. 10-p. 13, 1. 13. Results from the City's experts estimated that refurbishment
of the Blackfoot River pump station would cost just under $400,000, and that settling ponds
would be very expensive as well. Admin. Tr., p. 12, ll. 5-14. The most cost effective option was
drilling a new well, at an estimated cost of $80,000. Admin. Tr., p. 12, 11. 10-11.
The City first analyzed drilling a well very near to the pump station on the Blackfoot
River with the hope that it would qualify under the Department's current policy for essentially
changing a water right's source.

Admin. Tr., p. 11, 11. 13-24; see also Administrator's
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lvfemorandum, Transfer Processing

24,

26 (December 21, 2009) ("The ground water and

surface water sources must have a direct and immediate hydraulic connection (at least 50 percent
depletion in original source from depletion at proposed point of diversion in one day.)").
Unfortunately, based on analysis of the local geology, the City's consultants determined that
there is a basalt layer approximately 50 feet below land surface which would require the City to
hit a "sweet spot" of 48.5 feet for the well to function and operate appropriately. Admin. Tr., p.
12, 1. 25-p. 13, I. 6. With so little margin of error, the City elected to look at other options
instead. Admin. Tr., p. 13, 11. 7-13.
The alternative eventually pursued by the City was to drill a new well and use ground
water recharge from Jensen's Grove to mitigate for the ground water withdrawals. Admin. Tr.,
p. 13, IL 7-24. The operational costs of the new well are anticipated to be between $12,000 and
$14,000 per year, compared to $40,000 to $50,000 per year to maintain the Blackfoot River
pump station. Admin. Tr., p. 15, 11. 1-12. The result would be an estimated savings of between
$26,000 and $38,000 per year to the City. The new well would provide water to the lands
serviced by the pump station, most of which is within City limits or within the City's impact
area. Admin. Tr., p. 15, 11. 13-21. Accordingly, the City filed 12261 to authorize development
of a water right to provide water to the Miner's Ditch users. See A.R., pp. 1, 28, and 92.
I226lwas protested by the Coalition. A.R., pp. 66-67. The only matter at issue at the
hearing on this matter was the legal question of whether, under Idaho Code 42-203A(5)(a),
12261 "will reduce the quantity of water under existing water rights" based on the Settlement
Agreement and the use of 181 C for mitigation purposes.
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II.

A.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL.

Whether the Director erred in a manner described in Idaho Code § 67-5279(3) by failing
to consider the Settlement Agreement, JDWR Transfer of Water Right, Transfer No.
72385, June 2006, as an element of Water Right No. 01-18IC.

B.

Whether the Director erred in a manner described in Idaho Code § 67-5279(3) by not
engaging in contractual interpretation of the Settlement Agreement, ID WR Transfer of
Water Right, Transfer No. 72385, June 2006.

C.

Whether the Director erred in a manner described m Idaho Code § 67-5279(3) by
concluding that "[n]othing in Transfer No. 72[3]85 [sic] or the Partial Decree issued by
the Snake River Basin Adjudication indicate Right O1-181 C can be used for ground water
recharge." Final Order at 2. Stated another way, whether the City gave away its ability
to use O1-181 C to mitigate for 27-12261 when it entered into the Settlement Agreement,
IDWR Transfer of Water Right, Transfer No. 72385, June 2006.

D.

Whether the Director erred in a manner described in Idaho Code § 67-5279(3) by
concluding that the City must pursue a transfer application if it wants to use O1-181 C for
mitigation purposes. Final Order at 2.

E.

Whether the Director erred in a manner described m Idaho Code § 67-5279(3) by
determining that "any recharge to the aquifer achieved by diversion and use under Right
01-I81C, is merely incidental recharge [under Idaho Code § 42-234(5)] and cannot be
'used as a basis for claim of a separate or expanded water right."'
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III.

ARGUMENT.

While this Court "will review an agency's decision independent of the district court's
determination," McCoy v. State, Dep 't of Health & Welfare, 127 Idaho 792, 793, 907 P.2d 110,
111 (1995) (citations omitted); see also Idaho Appellate Practice Section, IDAHO APPELLATE
HANDBOOK V-46 (4th ed. 2015), "[t]his Court will not consider issues that were not raised before
the district court even if those issues had been raised in the administrative proceeding." Clear
Springs Foods v. Spackman, 150 Idaho 790, 797, 252 P.3d 71, 78 (2011). As this Court has

explained:
In an appeal from a district court where the court was acting in its
appellate capacity under the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act
("IDAPA"), "we review the decision of the district court to determine
whether it correctly decided the issues presented to it." Clear Springs
Foods v. Spackman, 150 Idaho 790, 797, 252 P.3d 71, 78 (2011).
However, we review the agency record independently of the district
court's decision. Spencer v. Kootenai Cnty., 145 Idaho 448, 452, 180 P.3d
487,491 (2008). A reviewing court "defers to the agency's findings of fact
unless they are clearly erroneous," and "the agency's factual
determinations are binding on the reviewing court, even when there is
conflicting evidence before the agency, so long as the determinations are
supported by substantial competent evidence in the record." A & B
Irrigation Dist. v. Idaho Dep 't of Water Res., 153 Idaho 500, 505-06, 284
P.3d 225, 230-31 (2012). "This Court freely reviews questions of law."
Vickers v. Lowe, 150 Idaho 439,442, 247 P.3d 666,669 (2011).
The district court must affirm the agency action unless it finds that the
agency's findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(c) made upon unlawful procedure;
(d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole;
or
(e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.
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I.C. § 67-5279(3); Clear Springs Foods, 150 Idaho at 796, 252 P.3d at 77.
Even if one of these conditions is met, an "agency action shall be affirmed
unless substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced." LC. § 675279(4).

Rangen, Inc. v. Idaho Dep't of Water Res., 160 Idaho 251, _ _, 371 P.3d 305,309 (2016); see
also Idaho Ground Water Assoc. v. Idaho Dep't of Water Res., 160 Idaho 119, _ _ , 369 P.3d
897, 903-04 (2016), reh 'g denied (May 9, 2016); North Snake Ground Water Dist. v. Idaho

Dep 't of Water Res., 160 Idaho 518,376 P.3d 722 (2016).
In this case, the Coalition did not present any testimony or other factual challenge to the
City's mitigation plan to use a component of 181 C to mitigate for 12261. Thus, the only issues
on appeal are questions of law, over which "[t]his Court has free review." A&B Irr. Dist. v.

Idaho Dep'tofWater Res., 153 Idaho 500,516,284 P.3d 225,241 (2012).
A.

The Settlement Agreement is incorporated into 181 C, and should therefore have been
considered in construing 181 C.
The Settlement Agreement is explicitly incorporated into 72385, the transfer that amended

l 81C. A.R., Hrg. Exh. List, Exhibit 105, p. 90 (Condition 9). And, in accordance with the
Department's recommendation in the SRBA, the Settlement Agreement is explicitly incorporated
into the Partial Decree for 181 C, with identical language. A.R., Hrg. Exh. List, Exhibit 106, p.
93 (under "Other Provisions Necessary for Definition or Administration of this Water Right"
(capitalization modified)).

Because these documents, which define 181 C, incorporate the

Settlement Agreement, any consideration or determination of the complete nature of 181 C must
include the Settlement Agreement as a component of 181 C.
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Director refused to "consider[] or discuss[]" the Settlement Agreement. A.R., p.
The Director held that "the Settlement Agreement does not in any way affect the Director's
decision in this matter. The decision can be made using principles of Idaho water law without
referring to the Settlement Agreement."

A.R., p. 272 (italics added).

The District Court

affirmed, again without considering the Settlement Agreement, because the Partial Decree is
unambiguous as to its "purpose of use element" and therefore its "meaning and legal effect are
questions of law to be determined from the plain meaning of its own words." A.R., pp. 210-211.
However, the Director and the District Court erred by considering the Settlement Agreement to
somehow be extrinsic to the Partial Decree-and thus efficacious only if the Partial Decree is
ambiguous. As an incorporated part of the Partial Decree, the Settlement Agreement is part of
the Partial Decree. The error committed by the Director and the District Court lies in their
consideration of only a portion of the Partial Decree, while ignoring the portion contained in the

Settlement Agreement. This is because conditions contained in a water right are recognized as
part of the water right. For a water right permit, Idaho Code § 42-203A(5) allows the Director to
"grant a permit upon conditions." The perfected permit is then licensed pursuant to Idaho Code
§ 42-219 wherein the license issued must bear "the number of[] the permit under which the
works from which such water is taken were constructed."

Such license therefore must

incorporate any permit conditions and is part and parcel to all elements of the water right. As a
result of including these conditions in a license, "[s]uch license shall be binding upon the state
as to the right of such licensee to use the amount of water mentioned therein, and shall be prima
facie evidence as to such right[.]" Idaho Code§ 42-220 (emphasis added).
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The binding effect of conditions

a water right license remains unchanged in the formal

adjudication of a water right license. With claims submitted in an adjudication (such as the
SRBA), the claim form requires inclusion of "conditions of the exercise of any water right

included in any decree, license, approved transfer application or other document," Idaho Code §
42- l 409(i), the report of the director requires inclusion of the same conditions, Idaho Code § 4214 l 1(2)(i), and the final step of the adjudication process-issuance of the partial decree-is
required to "contain or incorporate a statement of each element of a water right as stated in
subsections (2) and (3) of section 42-1411, Idaho Code." Idaho Code § 42-1412(6) (emphasis
added). Simply stated, conditions in a water right license are elements of the water right and are
no less important than the diversion rate or any other water right element. It is impossible to
correctly interpret a contract, decree, or other legal document without having (and considering)
all of the pages of the document-yet that is precisely the faulty analysis engaged in by both the
Director and the District Court.
The Settlement Agreement is incorporated into 181C. The Department's approval of
72385 specifically states that it is "subject to additional conditions and limitations contained in
[the Settlement Agreement]." A.R., p. 90. The corresponding Partial Decree relating to 72385
contains the exact same language, explicitly incorporating the Settlement Agreement by
reference. A.R., p. 93.

In terms of analyzing whether the Settlement Agreement should be

considered incorporated into the Partial Decree, the principle is perhaps best illustrated in
divorce jurisprudence. In divorce cases, the parties will frequently arrive at a property settlement
agreement, which may or may not be incorporated, or merged, into the court's divorce decree.
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See, e.g. Phillips v. Phillips, 93 Idaho 384, 386-87, 462 P.2d 49, 51-52 (1969). Courts first look
within the four comers of the divorce decree to determine whether the agreement was
incorporated. Barley v. Smith, 149 Idaho 171, 177, 233 P.3d 102, 108 (2010). Only if the
divorce decree is ambiguous regarding incorporation may a court look to extrinsic evidence on
that issue. Id. If the agreement is incorporated, it has become a part of the divorce decree.
Davidson v. Soelberg, 154 Idaho 227, 230, 296 P.3d 433, 436 (Ct. App. 2013).

In such a

circumstance, the only way to enforce or otherwise adjudicate the incorporated agreement is to
pursue that action in the original divorce case, because it is no longer just an agreement between
the parties, but is the court's judgment. Id. Further, subsequent courts are not at liberty to ignore
or disregard the agreement, which has become part of the divorce decree. See id.
Here, neither the Director nor the District Court conducted any analysis relating to the
incorporation of the Settlement Agreement into the Partial Decree. The Director considered the
elements of 18IC in the approval of 72385 and the Partial Decree (A.R., Hrg. Exh. List,
Exhibits 105 and 106, respectively) without considering the Settlement Agreement at all. A.R., p.
272. In the same vein, the District Court found the Partial Decree to be unambiguous, and
therefore refused to consider the Settlement Agreement.

A.R., pp. 210-211.

The practical

rationale underlying these decisions, expressed by the Department, is that a watermaster should
be entitled to rely on the "face of the decree" to know how to administer and enforce the water
right. However, this flies in the face of the statute, which unambiguously and plainly allows a
water right to either "contain or incorporate a statement of each element of a water right."
Idaho Code§ 42-1412(6) (emphasis added).
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While it may be the best practice to include all of the detail pertaining to each water right
element on a one or two page document, that is not required by Idaho Code§ 42-1412(6). An
example of a complicated partial decree with numerous provisions is the Partial Decree for

Federal Reserved Water Rights 75-13316 and 77-11941, decreed by the SRBA Court on
November 16, 2004. While the Department may want every water right to be like this, it cannot
disregard elements that are not in exactly such a form. It is unreasonable and overly formalistic
to be limited to looking only to the certain space to the right of each element's heading on a
partial decree for the complete description of that element, especially as water rights become
more complicated with creative settlement provisions or creative conditions imposed by a
hearing officer after a contested case meant to address injury concerns specifically raised in the
unique facts of the contested case. Further, it is beyond the Department's statutory authority to
impose a restriction that a water right must contain all of its elements either on the face of the
document or in a particular place on a form document because the Idaho Code allows a water
right to either "contain or incorporate" those elements. Idaho Code§ 42-1412(6). For the same
reason, the Director and the District Court erred when they exalted form over substance, and
ignored an incorporated document that stated elements of 181C-the Settlement Agreement.
By conducting the germane analysis, this Court must conclude that the Settlement

Agreement was incorporated into the approval of 72385 and the Partial Decree that affected
181C. The first step of the appropriate analysis, "to look first only to the four corners" of the
judgment, Barley, 149 Idaho at 177, 233 P.3d at 108 (emphasis in original), is dispositive since
both the administrative determination and the judicial decree clearly and unambiguously
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incorporate the Settlement Agreement. Both the approval and the Partial Decree state that the
diversion and use under 181 C is "subject to additional conditions and limitations contained in
[the Settlement Agreement]." A.R., Hrg. Exh. List, Exhibit 105, p. 90; id, Exhibit 106, p. 93.
The reference to the Settlement Agreement is not informational or informative; rather, it is
integrative. With this language, the relevant provisions of the Settlement Agreement are elevated
to being conditions and limitations-i. e., elements---of 181 C. There is no ambiguity in this
language, and thus no need to consider any evidence extrinsic to those documents to determine
whether the Settlement Agreement was incorporated into 181C. To consider 181C without the
Settlement Agreement, as the Director and the District Court did, is to consider only part of the

City's water right. Any interpretation of a legal document that refuses to review or consider part
of that document is erroneous, particularly when the unconsidered portion bears on the issue
requiring interpretation. The Settlement Agreement is not extrinsic, parol evidence that can only
be considered after the Partial Decree is found to be ambiguous-rather, it is an incorporated
part of the Partial Decree that must be interpreted along with the rest of that document.
The Director and the District Court did not give appropriate consideration to the
Settlement Agreement and, instead, focused on the remainder of 181 C to excuse any analysis of

the provisions of the Settlement Agreement. In effect, the Director and District Court used one
portion of 181 C to disregard another portion of 181 C, despite the statutory edict that all such
conditions are "binding upon the state." Idaho Code § 42-220. Ignoring and disregarding those
conditions of 181 C contained in the Settlement Agreement was not a lawful exercise of the
Director's discretion or the District Court's discretion.
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The only way to understand 181 C is to consider and construe (by contractual
interpretation) the Settlement Agreement.

The Director's error is in violation of applicable

statutory provisions (Idaho Code §§ 42-203A(5), 42-219, 42-1409, 42-1411, 42-1412(6))
because the Director may not arbitrarily ignore any part of an appropriator's water right. The
error was made unsupported by substantial evidence, since there is nothing to show that the

Settlement Agreement is not relevant to this dispute. Finally, the error was arbitrary, capricious,
and an abuse of discretion, since the three sentences in the Final Order detailing the Director's
decision to ignore the Settlement Agreement provide no rational reason for ignoring what was
incorporated by the Department's approval of 72385 and the SRBA's partial decree regarding
181C.
B.

The Settlement Agreement, as part of 181 C, demonstrates that 12261 can be
approved with reference to the recharge actually provided by 181C.

Because the Settlement Agreement is incorporated into 181 C it must be construed (along
with the rest of 181 C) in order to determine how 181 C relates to 12261 and answer the following
questions: (1) whether the City gave away its ability to use 181C to mitigate for 12261 when it
entered into the Settlement Agreement; (2) whether the City must receive approval of a transfer
in order to have the Department consider any portion of 181 C as mitigation; and (3) whether the
recharge provided to the aquifer through the exercise of 181 C can be used as mitigation or
whether the recharge is merely incidental.
1.

The plain language of the Settlement Agreement, when considered in
conjunction with the rest of 181 C, shows that the City should be allowed
to utilize the annual seepage loss of 181 C as mitigation for 12261.
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The interpretation of three paragraphs-paragraphs I .a., 1.b., and l .e--of the Settlement
Agreement are critical in determining the rights of the City in this matter. These provisions

provide:
a. After approval of the pending Transfer, the CITY shall not,
temporarily or permanently, thereafter transfer the Water Right, or any
portion thereof, without receiving the written consent of the
COALITION.
b. Without the written consent of the COALITION, the CITY agrees to
hold the Water Right in perpetuity for diversion of the water from the
Snake River into storage at the Pond, for irrigation and recreation
purposes, and to not transfer the Water Right or change the nature of
use or place of use of the Water Right.

e. The CITY shall not lease, sell, transfer, grant, or assign to any other
person or entity any right to recover groundwater or mitigation for the
diversion of groundwater as a result of diversions under the Water
Right including any incidental groundwater recharge that may occur as
a result of such diversions. Furthermore, the CITY shall not request or
receive any such mitigation credit on behalf of any other person or
If the CITY proposes to utilize the Water Right for
entity.
groundwater recharge or mitigation purposes associated with existing
or future groundwater rights, the CITY must file the appropriate
application for permit and/or transfer.
A.R., Hrg. Exh. List, Exhibit 4, pp. 19-20 (capitalization in original).
Contractual interpretation is a two-step process wherein the administrative agency or
court first reviews the plain language of the contract to determine if there is an ambiguity. City
of Meridian v. Petra Inc., 154 Idaho 425, 435, 299 P.3d 232, 242 (2013) (citations omitted). If

there is no ambiguity, then the contract is interpreted consistent with its plain language. Id.; see
also Kepler-Fleenor v. Fremont Cnty., 152 Idaho 207,211,268 P.3d 1159, 1163 (2012). This is
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especially true where, as here, 4 the contract is fully integrated; meaning that the language

the

contract reflects the entirety of the parties' intent. City of }vferidian, 154 Idaho at 435, 299 P.3d
at 242 (citations omitted); Hap Taylor & Sons, Inc. v. Summerwind Partners, LLC, 157 Idaho
600, 610, 338 P.3d 1204, 1214 (2014). Only if there is ambiguity in the term or terms in dispute
may the court or hearing officer resort to extrinsic evidence, also known as parol evidence, to
interpret the ambiguous provisions. Buku Properties, LLC v. Clark, 153 Idaho 828, 834, 291
P.3d 1027, 1033 (2012). In the face of ambiguity, the goal remains to give effect to the parties'
intent at the time of contracting. Hap Taylor & Sons, 157 Idaho at 610,338 P.3d at 1214; Bondy
v. Levy, 121 Idaho 993,998,829 P.2d 1342, 1347 (1992).

As already explained above, neither the Director nor the District Court considered or
interpreted the Settlement Agreement. The Director found that 181 C as currently described could
not be used for mitigation, "using principles of Idaho water law without referring to the
Settlement Agreement." AR., p. 272 (italics added). Surprisingly, that position was not based

on arguments advocated by the Coalition. The District Court affirmed, finding "no ambiguity in
the purpose of use element of [ 181 C]" that would require consideration of the Settlement
Agreement.

A.R., p. 212.

However, both the Director and the District Court should have

engaged in the contractual interpretation process.
Paragraph I.a. and l.b. both refer to a "transfer" or to "change the nature of use or place
of use" of 181 C as administrative actions that require the Coalition's consent, but these
provisions do not mention a water right permit application. A "transfer" or "change in the nature
The Settlement Agreement is an integrated agreement. See A.R., Hrg. Exh. List, Exhibit 4, p. 21, ,r 7.
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of

are terms of art under Idaho water law and are specific to the provisions of Idaho Code §

42-222, not the provisions of Idaho Code § 42-203A(5) for new permit applications.
Furthermore, these provisions were included and approved by the Coalition as a party to the
Agreement, and it perhaps goes without saying that the Coalition is very familiar with Idaho
water law. Use of these specific terms of art borrows that specific meaning. Because 12261 is
an application for permit, and not a transfer application, the provisions of Paragraphs I.a and 1.b
do not require written consent from the Coalition. Consequently, there is no legal limitation
under these provisions that would prohibit the City from pursuing 12261 without obtaining
written consent from the Coalition.
Similarly, there is no part of the plain language of Paragraph 1.e which would require the
City to file a transfer to realize the benefits associated with seepage under 181 C already
approved through the prior transfer that changed its nature of use. Through that transfer, 181 C
expressly recognized the seepage that would occur in Jensen's Grove and incorporated the
provisions of the Settlement Agreement wherein the City retained the right to claim the benefits
of the recharge.
In what appears to be a clear attempt to prevent others from benefitting from Jensen's
Grove recharge under 181 C, the first sentence of Paragraph l .e provides:
The CITY shall not lease, sell, transfer, grant, or assign to any other
person or entity any right to recover groundwater or mitigation for the
diversion of groundwater as a result of diversions under the Water Right
including any incidental groundwater recharge that may occur as a
result of such diversions.
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A.R., p. 20 (bold emphasis added, capitalization in original). Nothing in the plain language of
this provision states that the City cannot claim any credit from the ground water recharge
occurring under 181 C. In fact, the plain language of this sentence contemplates that the City
would actually accrue benefits from ground water recharge, but that it could not convey
those benefits to "any other person or entity." A.R., p. 20. Additionally, while this sentence
mentions "incidental groundwater recharge," it does not define all the mitigation provided by
181 C as incidental, but merely includes the incidental language as a catch-all. A.R., p. 20; see

also Section III.B.2., infra (regarding incidental recharge).
The second sentence of Paragraph l .e is similar to the first, and it provides that the City
"shall not request or receive any such mitigation credit on behalf of any other person or entity."
R. at 20. Again, this sentence recognizes the recharge benefits the City generates, and it does not
say that the City itself cannot claim any credit from the ground water recharge occurring through
the annual seepage. While the first sentence prevents the City from transferring ground water
recharge benefits, this second sentence prevents the City from requesting or receiving such
benefits on behalf of someone else.
Finally, the third sentence of Paragraph l.e most directly addresses the City's ability to
use the benefits or credits of ground water recharge occurring under 181 C:
If the CITY proposes to utilize the Water Right for groundwater recharge
or mitigation purposes associated with existing or future groundwater
rights, the CITY must file the appropriate application for permit
and/or transfer.
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p. 20 (underlining and bold emphasis added, capitalization in original). This sentence does
not prohibit the City from using ground water recharge under 181 C for mitigation. In fact, it
specifically states that the City can use the mitigation benefits as long as it submits the
appropriate application for permit and/or transfer. The use of "and/or" unambiguously allows
the City to file (a) an appropriate application for permit, (b) an appropriate transfer, or (c) bothin order to claim credit for the mitigation occurring under 181 C. Under the plain language of
Paragraph 1.e, the City is permitted to use 181 C "for groundwater recharge or mitigation
purposes associated with future groundwater rights," A.R., p. 20, and 12261 is a future ground
water right sought by the appropriate application for permit because a transfer is unnecessary
(see Section III.B.2, infra).

Based on the plain language of the Settlement Agreement, the City has the option of filing
a permit application (and/or transfer) to realize the benefits of the seepage under 181 C.
Accordingly, the City has submitted 12261, a permit application. There is nothing ambiguous
about these provisions. If the Settlement Agreement was intended to bar the City from using
181 C for any mitigation or recharge purposes, it should have simply said so. The Settlement
Agreement does not say this. In fact, the Settlement Agreement is preoccupied with preventing

the City from conveying the mitigation benefits of 181 C (either directly or indirectly) to any
third party. In other words, the Settlement Agreement specifically recognizes the mitigation, in
the form of ground water recharge, resulting from 181C and only limits how the City can later
utilize the benefits from such recharge. If the parties intended the Settlement Agreement to
require the Coalition's consent in all cases where 181 C is proposed as mitigation, the contract

APPELLANT'S BRIEF-PAGE 24

would have simply stated that the City must obtain the Coalition's consent before submitting a
permit application that requires mitigation under 181 C. Or it could say that there is no recharge
benefit from 181 C, without the necessity of specifying that such a recharge benefit cannot be
conveyed to or applied on behalf of another. The Settlement Agreement does not say any of this;
and that omission does not create an ambiguity.
The Director erred by relying on parol evidence (correspondence between the parties'
attorneys) to find an ambiguity sufficient to consider parol evidence in construing 181 C. A.R., p.
272 (citing exhibits 8 and 103 from the administrative hearing, presently A.R., Hrg. Exh. List,
Exhibit 8, p. 46 and id, Exhibit 103, p. 70, respectively). This approach gets the analysis of
contractual interpretation out of order. Parol evidence cannot be the source of ambiguity that
causes this Court to consider parol evidence to interpret 181 C, including the Settlement
Agreement. See Steel Farms, Inc. v. Croft & Reed, Inc., 154 Idaho 259, 266, 297 P.3d 222, 229

(2012) ("Paro) evidence may be considered to aid a trial court in determining the intent of the
drafter of a document if ambiguity exists," citation omitted).
The only evidence presented at the hearing of the contemporaneous negotiations or
conversations concerning the Settlement Agreement were from Mayor Reese, the mayor of the
City at the time the Settlement Agreement was executed. Admin. Tr., pp. 34-49. Mayor Reese
was asked what his recollection of the Settlement Agreement was relative to ground water
recharge, and he testified that the City neither gave up nor intended to give up its right to use
recharge from Jensen's Grove under 181C in the settlement negotiations. Admin. Tr., p. 38, 1. 5p. 40, 1. 19. The mayor also discussed the provisions of Paragraph l.e, and the language therein
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stating that the City preserved the right to submit an application for permit to utilize the benefits
accruing from the ground water recharge in Jensen's Grove under 181C. Admin. Tr., p. 38, I. 5p. 40, 1. 19. This is consistent with the plain language of the Settlement Agreement.
No member of the Coalition was present to submit any extraneous evidence supporting
the Coalition's interpretation of the Settlement Agreement. As stated above, the Coalition did not
elicit any testimony from its clients or anyone on its clients' behalf on this issue. Even if this
Court reviews and considers the correspondence of the Coalition's attorney regarding approval
of 72385, A.R., Hrg. Exh. List, Exhibits 8 and 9, pp. 46-48, nothing there states that the City
cannot claim the annual seepage from 181 C for mitigation under a permit application. The
correspondence provides a conclusory legal argument based on the language of the Settlement

Agreement, rather than a factual argument that illuminates any parties' intent; therefore the
correspondence has only minor probative value of the parties' intent in drafting the Settlement

Agreement. See A.R., Hrg. Exh. List, Exhibits 8 and 9, pp. 46-48. In fact, the correspondence
only addresses a request to not expressly include ground water recharge as a beneficial use at the
time of the transfer approval. This makes sense under the terms of the Settlement Agreement
because the benefits of the recharge could not be realized yet until the City filed an application
for permit (such as 12261) or a transfer application. In other words, the City could not claim
recharge credit for recharging under 181 C alone. The Settlement Agreement required the City to
pair it with a separate water right permit or to amend 181 C through a transfer. Accordingly, it
was correct to not list groundwater recharge as an express beneficial use under 181 C when
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72385 was approved because there was an agreed-to second step that the City had to take before
realizing the recharge benefits.
In contrast to the Director's analysis, the District Court found that the Partial Decree
"unambiguously provide[d] that water may be diverted" under 181 C for five, and only five,
purposes. A.R., p. 211. The District Court focused on those five purposes of use listed under the
"purpose of use" heading on the face of the Partial Decree, where that court found "no
ambiguity," and concluded that the City's argument-considering the incorporated Settlement
Agreement along with the other elements of 181 C-was "not an additional condition and

limitation," but rather is "an impermissible expansion of the purpose of use element of [181 C]."
A.R., p. 212.

In other words, the District Court focused on the lack of ambiguity under the

"purpose of use" heading, and disregarded any application, interpretation, or construction of the
Settlement Agreement. A.R., p. 212. The error in the District Court's analysis occurs in only

allowing an element of a water right to be defined in a certain place within its decree and
nowhere else in that decree. Such an approach exalts form over substance, and finds no legal
support in Idaho or elsewhere.
The Director and District Court both erred in failing to consider that the Settlement
Agreement, as part of 181 C, expressly forbids the City from conveying any mitigation credit

associated with 181 C to any third party without the Coalition's approval and, while tacitly
acknowledging that 181 C provides mitigation, the Settlement Agreement does not bar the City
from using that mitigation itself.

Properly interpreted by this Court, it should find that the

Settlement Agreement allows the City to use the recharge from 181 C to mitigate for 12261.
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The mltlgation provided by 181 C can be used to mitigate for 12261
without the necessity of filing a transfer to expressly list ground water
recharge as a beneficial use of 181 C.
The Settlement Agreement, which is incorporated into 181 C, already acknowledges the
recharge occurring under 181 C and the parties' limitation of the circumstances upon which the
City could use that recharge. The Director and the District Court both ignored the Settlement

Agreement, and focused instead on the listed beneficial uses of the water right, which do not list
ground water recharge as one of those uses, and for good reason. As explained above, until the
City wanted to claim credit for the ground water recharge, it had to file an application for permit
or a transfer, so why list ground water recharge on the face of the water right? By only reading
the listed elements of the water right, and ignoring the Settlement Agreement, the Director and
the District Court read the elements of 181 C much too narrowly. The Settlement Agreement
condition is just as much part of the water right as any other element of the water right.
Unfortunately, after incorrectly ignoring the Settlement Agreement, the Final Order
proceeds down an analytical track that it should not have gone, and we see no need to respond to
the nuances that the Director discussed (such as the difference between how non-use of a water
right does not require a transfer but a change in how a water right is used does require one).
From the City's perspective, it is only trying to finally get credit for recharge that everyone
factually acknowledges it is responsible for:
Q. Was the City going to forfeit it for a time, a period of time, meaning
that they weren't getting any credit at the time the application was settled?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. But did the City agree, to your understanding, to forfeit that
forever?
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A. No.
Admin. Tr., p. 39, 1. 22-p. 40, L 14 (Testimony of Mayor Scott Reese).
No additional conditions on 181 C are needed because the Settlement Agreement already
recognizes the mitigation, or ground water recharge, that occurs.

The Final Order ignores

72385-the prior approved transfer wherein the ability for the City to realize the benefits
associated with seepage under 181 C-which was already approved, expressly recognized the
seepage occurring in Jensen's Grove, and incorporated the provisions of the Settlement
Agreement wherein the City retained the right to claim the benefits of the recharge (while

bargaining away its ability to convey that right to any third party without the Coalition's
approval).
The District Court affirmed and correspondingly required that the City file a transfer to
add recharge as an express beneficial use of 181C. A.R., pp. 213-14. Again, the court dwells on
the fact that "[t]he uses of water authorized under the [Partial] Decree are ascertainable from a
simple reading of the purpose of use element. They did not include recharge." A.R., p. 214. It
was significant to the court below that the City did not appeal the Partial Decree's omission of
recharge as an element of the face of the decree. See A.R., p. 214. This lack of an appeal arises
from an internally consistent application of the Court's implicit presumption: the form of the
water right (i.e., the location of each element can only be on the face of the decree and only
under the heading describing that element). The City challenges that unsupported presumption.
And it is because the City believes that any element of a water right may be stated anywhere in
the decree (even in an incorporated document, as contemplated by Idaho Code§ 42-1412(6)) that
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the City considered that 181 C already recognized and quantified the mitigation provided by the
seepage in Jensen's Grove; thus, there was nothing to appeai in the Partial Decree.
The City arrives at this conclusion based on the statutory definition of a water right.
Idaho's adjudication statutes describe what the elements of a water right are. Each partial decree
must include "each element of a water right as stated in subsections (2) and (3) of section 421411, Idaho Code, as applicable." Idaho Code§ 42-1412(6) (emphasis added). In turn, Idaho
Code § 42-1411(2) explicitly provides that "[t]he [D]irector shall determine the following
elements," which are then listed, including:
(i) conditions on the exercise of any water right included in any decree,

license, or approved transfer application; and
G) such remarks and other matters as are necessary for definition of the
right, for clarification of any element of the right, or for administration
of the right by the [D]irector.
Idaho Code§ 42-1411(2) (emphasis added).
The items outlined in Idaho Code§ 42-1411(2)(i) and G)-conditions and remarks-are
elements of a water right defined by statute. Not surprisingly, case law is in accord with these
statutory provisions. After quoting the entirety of Idaho Code § 42-1411(2), this Court has
determined that "[t]he elements listed describe the basic elements of a water right." City of

Pocatello v. Idaho, 152 Idaho 830,839,275 P.3d 845, 854 (2012) (internal citation omitted); see
also Rangen, Inc. v. Idaho Dep 't of Water Res., 159 Idaho 798, 367 P.3d 193 (2016).
Accordingly, the conditions incorporated into the partial decree of 181 C-including reference to
the "terms and conditions" of the Settlement Agreement-are elements of 181C.
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No single element is more important than any other element.

Likewise, there is no

requirement-in statute, administrative rule, or case law-that elements, or terms, can only be
effective under the heading under which they are listed. "Idaho courts interpret water decrees
using the same interpretation rules that apply to contracts." Rangen, Inc. v. Idaho Dep 't ~f Water
Res., 159 Idaho at _ _ , 367 P.3d at 202 (citation omitted). "When interpreting a [water right

decree], this Court begins with the document's language." Potlatch Educ. Ass 'n v. Potlatch Sch.
Dist. No. 285, 148 Idaho 630,633,226 P.3d 1277, 1280 (2010). "The purpose of interpreting a

[water right decree] is to determine the intent of the [decreeing court] at the time the [water right
decree] was entered. In determining the intent of the [decreeing court], this Court must view the
[water right decree] as a whole." Pocatello Hosp., LLC v. Quail Ridge Med. Inv'r, LLC, 156
Idaho 709, 720, 330 P.3d 1067, 1078 (2014). Thus, rather than exalting form over substance by
narrowing the interpretation of a water right decree to just considering only the elements under
each heading as affecting that listed element, the better legal analysis is to consider a decree as a
whole. This makes the entirety of the decree efficacious, as required by contractual analysis, and
the practical consideration that a water right decree may take more than one form. While it is
clear that an adjudication court may adopt a specific template for drafting partial decrees for
general consistency, use of such a template does not automatically mean other drafted forms of a
partial decree are defective.
The result here is that there is no need for the City to file a second transfer for 181 C and
then renew another permit application proceeding like 12261 (as required by the Final Order and
affirmed by the District Court) and provide the Coalition, and other persons, two additional
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chances to protest this action and make it more costly for the State, the Department, and
especially the City to beneficially use the water that undisputedly seeps into the ESP A from
Jensen's Grove each and every year.
Instead, consistent with 72385 and the Settlement Agreement, approval of 181 C's seepage
as mitigation for 12261 should be addressed through the conditions of approval for 12261.
Providing conditions for approval is something that the Department does routinely and the
mitigation provided by 181 C should be addressed in the same way. It is important to note on this
point that the Department did not state or advise the City at the time it submitted its application
and revised applications- with which the Department assisted-that the City had to file another
transfer of 181 C before it could be used for mitigation purposes. The City believed that any
question of injury caused by using 181 C for mitigation purposes was to be-and actually wasaddressed in this contested case. A transfer would be an unnecessary, duplicative proceeding;
again, an exaltation of form over substance.

As a result, this Court should determine that

seepage from 181C can be designated in the approval order for 12261 as mitigation without the
need for the City to file a transfer for this water right.
Finally, if a transfer for 181 C was required, the Department should have informed the
City before proceeding to a hearing on 12261.

The transfer could have been filed and

consolidated with the 12261 proceedings to address the entire matter at once. The Department's
determination that a transfer now has to be filed will subject the City to a duplicitous hearing.
And it is unlikely that a transfer hearing will even occur. It is umealistic to think that that the
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Coalition will consent to the transfer only to later protest it The consent will not be given,
which will effectively hold the City hostage indefinitely.
In sum, a transfer application is not necessary because the City's ability to realize the
benefits associated with 181C's annual seepage was already approved through 72385 that
changed 18IC's nature of use and expressly recognized the seepage that occurs annually and
incorporated the provisions of the Settlement Agreement, wherein the City retained the right to
claim the benefits of the mitigation itself. It is only if the City wanted to file a transfer to add
beneficial uses which would allow the City to recharge under the express terms of the water right
and possibly assign those benefits to others that the Settlement Agreement addressed and limited.
Accordingly, a transfer application is not the only way for the City to utilize 181 C and the
Coalition's consent is not necessary to utilize the ground water seepage occurring under l 81C for
mitigation purposes. 5
C.

Regardless of the elements of 181C, the uncontroverted, actual circumstances
of 181C demonstrate that it provides mitigation for 12261.

The annual seepage of 2,080.8 AF into the ESPA from Jensen's Grove was, and is,
intentional and not incidental, and may therefore be considered as mitigation. The Director held
that "[w]ithout expressly listing recharge as a beneficial use, any recharge to the aquifer achieved
by diversion and use under Right 181 C, is merely incidental recharge and cannot be 'used as the
basis for claim of a separate or expanded water right."' A.R., p. 272 (quoting Idaho Code

We note that if the City were to change the nature of use of other portions of O1-181 C (such as converting the
right back to solely an irrigation water right), such a transfer application would require consent from the
Coalition based on the plain language of the Settlement Agreement. However, as to utilization of the ground
water recharge benefits, no such consent is required.
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§ 42-234(5)).

While the City agrees that, pursuant to Idaho Code § 42-234(5), incidental

recharge cannot be used as the basis for an additional water right, the proposition that because
ground water recharge is not an expressly-listed beneficial use on one water right, any recharge
is ipso facto incidental is unsupported and unsupportable.
This Court has recently made clear that "[t]here is nothing improper about mitigation as a
beneficial use."

North Snake Ground Water Dist., 160 Idaho at _ _ , 376 P.3d at 731.

However, it is equally apparent that mitigation does not have to be listed as a beneficial use for a
water right to be used as mitigation. This flexibility exists, at least in part, because mitigation is
not explicitly defined or described by statute, but use of mitigation associated with water is
implied from the Department's ability to approve any application "upon conditions." Idaho
Code § 42-203A(5). The Department has specified that "[a]n application that would otherwise
be denied because of injury to another water right may be approved upon conditions which will
mitigate losses of water to the holder of an existing water right, as determined by the Director."
ID APA 37.03.08.045.01.a.iv. This singular mention of mitigation in the context of a water right
application suggests that it is broad and involves analysis of the actual utilization of water rather
than only looking at the beneficial uses listed on the face of the water right.
Contrary to the Department's rules, the Director, in this case, refused to consider
compliance with the Settlement Agreement as a "condition[] which will mitigate losses of water"
to other water users. IDAPA 37.03.08.045.01.a.iv. There is no factual dispute that 2,080.8 AF
of water seeps from Jensen's Grove into the ESPA each year. See Clerk's R., p. 136 (page 1 of
the Coalition's response brief below, noting that the City and the Coalition "stipulated that the
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modeling performed by the City's experts showed that recharge in Jensen's Grove could offset
the impacts resulting from" 27-12261 ). This amount of water re-entering the aquifer provides
mitigation for 27-12261 and nothing prevents Respondents from considering those facts as
mitigation.
Non-use of one water right can, without the filing of a transfer, mitigate for another
water right. The reasoning for this principle is that the non-use of an existing water right is a
condition for the approval of the permit for the new water right, which the Department can
impose.

Idaho Code § 42-203A(5).

In this case, the non-use is a "condition[] which will

mitigate losses of water," and allows the Department to approve the subsequent water right.
IDAPA 37.03.08.045.01.a.iv. In doing so, the Department takes reality into account, and is not
constrained by the black-and-white details on the face of each water right, because these are
situations where mitigation is not required to be explicitly listed as a beneficial use.

It is noteworthy in this case that the Coalition has not protested that portion of the City's
other water rights in the Blackfoot River which the City proposes to hold unused. See A.R., p.
204 ("The Coalition did not challenge the City's proposal to hold 6.2 acres of Blackfoot River
right unused to offset depletions to the Snake River downstream of Blackfoot"). In fact, "the
Coalition stipulated that leaving a small portion of additional water in the Snake River [system]
would offset [the] mitigation deficiency." Clerk's R., p. 136. This is important, because the City
has not filed any transfer application to use these Blackfoot River water rights as mitigation for
12261, nor was the City requested to do so by the Coalition.
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Incidental recharge is a term of art referring to recharge not expressly listed as an element
of a water right but occurs as an incident to the exercise of the water right. The primary example
of incidental recharge is canal seepage associated with the diversion of surface water under an
irrigation water right. The recharge occurring through the diversion of water under 181 C is the
"incidental recharge" described under Idaho Code § 42-234(5). The Settlement Agreement is an
express condition of 181 C. 181 C was previously an irrigation water right, and when its nature of
use was changed, 72385 described how it could be used and 72385 specifically includes as a
condition of the exercise of 181 C that it is subject to the conditions of the Settlement Agreement.
Both the Settlement Agreement and the reference to seepage losses on the face of 181 C expressly
acknowledge the ground water recharge that occurs under 18IC. That which is express is not
implied or incidental. The annual seepage accounted for in 181 C is allowed with the express
purpose of providing recharge to the aquifer so that the City (and not some third party, as
apparently concerned the Coalition) could use that as mitigation. This is allowed by 181 C and
the Settlement Agreement (see Section IILB., supra), and therefore, is not incidental recharge
under Idaho Code § 42-234(5). All of the evidence indicates that the City intended (and still
intends) for the 2,080.8 AF of annual seepage to recharge the aquifer and be used to offset an
application for permit, which, in this matter, is 12261.
D. The Director's actions prejudiced a substantial right of the City.
Generally, "directly interested parties ... have, as a procedural matter, substantial rights
m a reasonably fair decision-making process and, of course, in proper adjudication of the
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proceeding by application of correct legal standards." State Transp. Dep 't v. Kalani-Keegan,
155 Idaho 297,302,311 P.3d 309,314 (Ct. App. 2013).
Here, the City is a directly interested party, since it made the application for 12261. The
Department's procedure was "a reasonably fair decision-making process." Id. However, the
Department's adjudication was not made by the "application of correct legal standards." Id. As
discussed above, the Final Order-as affirmed by the District Court--erroneously failed to
consider the Settlement Agreement, which is an incorporated part of 181 C and the application of
Idaho water law to this case in the absence of the entirety of 181 C was incorrect. Additionally,
the law was applied by the Director incorrectly, since he wholly failed to consider mitigatory
conditions for 12261 since his analysis hung solely on the fact that ground water recharge is not
listed as a beneficial use of 181 C. Thus, the City's substantial right "in proper adjudication of
the proceeding by application of correct legal standards" was violated. Id.

IV.

CONCLUSION.

The City never intended to give away the recharge benefits from 181 C's diversion and
use in Jensen's Grove. The plain language of the Settlement Agreement supports the City's
position that it never gave away its rights to use the recharge occurring in Jensen's Grove from
diversion of water under 181C. If it did, why didn't the Settlement Agreement just say that it
could not ever claim those benefits?
For the reasons set forth above, there is no legal impediment to using 181C's annual
seepage in a mitigation plan for 12261.

Under the plain language of Paragraph l.e of the

Settlement Agreement, the City is permitted to use 181 C "for groundwater recharge or mitigation
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purposes associated with future groundwater rights, and 12261 is a future ground water right
12261 provides substantial benefits to the City in the form of reduced costs of maintaining the
Blackfoot River pump station. Furthermore, because 12261 is an application for permit, and not
a transfer application, the provisions of Paragraphs I.a and l.b do not require written consent
from the Coalition.
The errors described above have been made in violation of statutory provisions; in excess
of the statutory authority of the Department; without support of substantial evidence; and were
arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion. The errors have violated the City's substantial
right in the proper adjudication of this matter by the application of correct legal standards.
Where, as here, "there is no indication in the record that further findings of fact could be made
from the paucity of evidence that would affect the outcome of this case," remand to the
Department is unnecessary. Bonner Gen. Hosp. v. Bonner Cnty., 133 Idaho 7, 11,981 P.2d 242,
246 (1999); see also Idaho Code § 67-5279(3).

The Coalition has only ever made a legal

argument in this case, which can be answered by this Court upon the record already established
because contract interpretation is a matter of law.
This Court should issue an order approving the issuance of a permit for 12261 because
there are no legal impediments to using ground water recharge under 181 C to mitigate for 12261.
Indeed, such mitigation for a water right permit like 12261 was specifically contemplated under
the Settlement Agreement. A determination that the City must file a transfer and obtain consent
from the Coalition is contrary to the plain language of the Settlement Agreement, and as a
practical matter, the Coalition will not consent to any transfer. The inequitable result will be that
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the City will never be able to utilize the recharge benefits everyone acknowledges occurs at
Jensen's Grove under 181 C to aid the growing City of Blackfoot.

Dated this

~ day of October, 2016.
~L.
Robert L. Harris, Esq.
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.
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